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Contempt Of Court Complaint ForLegal action brought when the plaintiff/petitioner alleges a willful failure to obey a court order or judgment. Most such complaints are filed against husbands or ex-husbands for failure to make support payments. The defendant is generally entitled to an evidentiary hearing (trial) since he faces possible incarceration. Even where the court finds the defendant guilty of contempt, defendants are usually given the opportunity to comply with the violated order, or ?purge the contempt.? Jail is an extraordinary remedy. Remember, the object is not to kill the golden goose; jailbirds can?t pay support. To commence a contempt proceeding in many jurisdictions a complaint for contempt must be filed with the court, and a copy of the complaint, along with a summons, must be served on the defendant. Question: Should Sherriff Lee Baca be held in contempt of court for releasing Paris Hilton back to her mansion ? City attorney filed a complaint early yesterday (THUR) to show cause why, "Sherriff Lee Baca should not be held in comtempt of Court for releasing Hilton early and demanding that she be held in custody." Technically she was in custody because of her braclet remember that. "Boy,is this celebrity justice or what"
Question: Disprove Contempt Of Court? My husbands ex is taking him to court for "not allowing her to see their son" well she hasn't seen him in almost 3 years. Never wanted to. She was living back and forth between Hawaii and Iowa. Shes only claiming we didn't allow 4 out of like 20 visits, but most of the conversations were on the phone about her not taking her visits. We are wondering how do you disprove that? We have a few e-mails for about 2 out of the 4 visits shes claiming we didn't allow. Will e-mails be good? We can also get sworn statements from family and friends when they were here and heard parts of our conversations where she says she isn't taking her visit will that help? One more thing my husband is military and she made and IG complaint against him but she was found to be false if we bring that will it help to show that she likes to make things up?
Question: What can I do to STOP MY HUSBAND's tantrums? PLEASE!!!? He left because he "wasn't happy." He left because the married girlfriend was supposed to make him happy. He has been out of the house for almost a year. I even packed up the kids to go with him for a week to the beach with his married girlfriend ( He won't admit that she and her daughter went but I know that she did from friends.) I didn't even mention it or argue with him about it.BUT HE WON'T LET IT GO! WHY?
He keeps filing custody complaints and contempt of court petitions and his girfriend even filed a criminal complaint. Even though he and she keep losing, I get a new one every month.
WHY WON'T HE LET IT GO?
WHAT CAN I DO TO STOP IT? LEGALLY. WITHOUT COMMITTING A CRIME, PLEASE.
It is a really sick situation. He won't agree to a divorce but he won't file.
Her husband KNOWS that they are together and has even wtahced my kids along with his daughter so that my husband and his wife can go out. Sick!!!! I just want him to leave me alone. my lawyer says that he can still file these things even after a divorce.
Question: What to do if a employer will not enforce court order for child support? I live in Louisiana.I used a private attorney for my child support case and there was a judgment issued for wage garnishments and back pay. The judgment was sent to his employer in Nov. 2007 and it is now Feb. 2008 and I have not gotten anything. My son father employer has failed to comply with the court order. My attorney has tried to contact them several times but they will not respond. I was advised to get another attorney to file a contempt of court against his employer. I can not afford to keep spending out money for more attorneys what else can I do to get them to comply with the order. My ex is retiring in June so I have to get this resolved immediately so my son can recieve his back payments out of his retirement money. I have contacted my state representatives and have looked all over the internet for help. Is there anything else I can do to resolve this issue wihtout have to go back through the court system. And who can I contact to file a complaint against the company.
Question: The opposing side's witnesses in the audience kept talking during the entire court hearing in sign language...? Note: This question is only for legal aides, law students, former law students, and attorneys.
During the entire court hearing, the opposing side's witnesses kept talking to each other in American Sign Language, even talking to the interpreter while she was busy interpreting and saying things about me behind my back while I was giving my testimony, such as calling me a liar, and "shame on her." It's not on the court transcript but it's on the visual part of the audio-visual recording CD. The court commissioner did nothing about this. I am preparing to submit a detailed log of all of the signs that were said in a written complaint to the local courthouse today. What does this kind of behavior fall under? Is it contempt of court, or what exactly is this? What will the court house's most likely response be to this? Is there any kind of rule regarding silence in the audience-seating section of the court room, and does it apply to talking in sign language? Is this considered disruptive behavior? Thank you very much for your time.
I was representing myself in court, and I could not have known about this until I viewed the visual recording of the court hearing on CD after the hearing was finished. Since it was all done literally behind my back, I could not have seen any of it. And, since it is in sign language, I could not have heard any of it.
Question: someone i care about was court ordered to move out what do i do ? ok let me explain .. this person while yes i care about very much has stayed with us for a yr because he lost his place to live . Hes family and wed do anything for him. However he did bring alot of it on himelf this i know . He lost his job back in may and hadnt found work and yes i know the market has been slow and theres things he could of done but he didnt and i think he realizes that . With that said he realy has no place to go .. his dad has a full house and so does his mom , his friend whom hes with now temporarily cant keep him because he is moving soon .. and now because of this damn court order of them saying he had to move out even though theres no where in the statement that says he cant stay over a nite they throw a fit when he does .. and try to tell us we are in contempt of court . I want to see him get his stuff together but i dnt want to see him homeless either .. i never saw a problem with him being here because he was soo good with the kids and they loved him being here as did i . the only complaint would be that i wished wed had a boger place.. But needless to say we have to comply with the court order at least for another 60days until this blows over.. thankfully hes suppose to be gone for 2 months but we dnt know that for sure.. it broke my heart to see him go but at the same time i want to be able to at least help him a little bit here and there without geting in trouble for it .. what can i do ?? i mean hes family and i love him to death i know he needs to get himself together but im afraid he wont be able to without help
ok let me first off by sayng some are saying that i am under 18 and shoudnt worry about it .. well that would be fine if i was but im not im 28 thanks i just need some simple ideas as to what i can and cannot get away with preferably legal advice
Question: Who governs the actions of Court Judges? I'm emotionally involved in a case against my son's lawyer. The Judge ordered the lawyer to answer the complaint so all the findings could be ruled upon. The lawyer had 20 days after the Judge signed the order to comply. It's been 90 + days and the lawyer still has not answered. I brought it to the Court's attention through the Judge's coordinator, but still nothing has been done. What else can I do? Who can I go to that will nudge the Judge into doing his/her job and ruling the lawyer in contempt of court?
Thank you in advance for any advice.
I can't afford a lawyer of my own to help fight this case.
I'm in Texas.
Question: What can be done when a Judge is Bias? We have proof of domestic violence. Judge threatens contempt if mention? We have been going to court for months on custody of my child with father who I never married. He is also an attorney. It started with my house burning down. The father refused to bring my son back from visitation and went the next day for an emergency temporary custody order. He claimed child endangerment. I had recently met someone and he found out about it and told the judge I was allowing this man to spend the night with my children there. This is an absolute lie but judge will not believe me. I have been ordered not see this man again by the judge or I will loose my child permanantly. .There is a lot of past domestic violence in our relationship with police reports, pictures and audio of threats to my life. He has threatened me many times in front of my child. The judge not only threatened contempt of court if my attorney mentioned it again but, ordered me to parenting class and random drug testing in which the father has convienced judge I am on drugs. Over this past year I have had random drug tests on 40 negatives and 4 hair folicle test randomly done. All have been negative. My doctor prescribed Zanex for anziety due to all my legal problems and abuse. I told the judge about it and the people whom gave me a drug test. The test came back negative.The judge thinks I am altering the test. She ordered 3 more months of it before I can go back to court. The judge let the father sit in the witness stand for over an hour with no interuptions verbally abusing me. She allowed him to put me down and tell her how dumb he thought I was and I couldn't even cook oatmeal. He talked about I was so uninteligent that I had nothing to offer in conversation. He told the court I was uneducated. I am on my 4th attorney and nobody will help me or stand up to this man or the judge. I feel I will loose my child. I have been in several couseling sessions along with my 12 year old son. He is in a school for advanced studies. This child never had problems until all this.This child is now in counseling because of witnessing abuse and hearing it everyday for several yesrs. He has a different father. Judge will not let us talk about it. I simply don't know where to go for someone to help me with this nightmare. He has temporary custody and just recently I was allowed to seemy son without supervision. I have spent every dime on legal defenses and work 7 days a week for the past year to pay for all this. If I didn't know better I would think I was in the middle east countries where they stone women. This judge will slaughter me and my attorney if we report her right now. I simply don't knowhow I can be heard with this Judge. Is there a way in Oklahoma law to get the court room reporters papers on this case? How can I find out about complaints on a judge or lawyer? Help!!!
Question: Domestic Relations office not doing its job? The Domestic Relations office in my county (Chester Co. PA) does absolutely nothing. My ex was on probation for contempt of court. Three months ago, he stopped paying. Again. Domestic Relations told me they would IMMEDIATELY pursue him, since this is the 10th or 11th time (I am not exaggerating). So far, in these three months, Domestic Relations has done exactly nothing. No bench warrant, no lisence suspension, no credit bureau reporting, no asset seizures, nothing. Nada.
Oh, and even better, when we went in for an increase conference, he had his neighbor write a letter saying that he hurt his back and couldn't work more than 20 hours a week. Not his doctor; his neighbor (who, conviently is also his boss). And Domestic Relations accepted this without question.
So my question is, with what agency/department do I file a complaint? The Department of Welfare? The Court of Common Pleas?
Question: what is aloran scam? Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
OFELIA JOAQUIN , A.M. No. MTJ-06-1658
Complainant, [Formerly OCA IPI No. 01-1014-MTJ]
Present:
-versus -
ANGELA S. DELA CRUZ y. ALORAN
Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
R E S O L U T I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Before us is a sworn letter-complaint [1] dated September 18 , 1999 of Ofelia Joaquin (complainant) charging Angela S. Dela Cruz y. Aloran (respondent) , with scam and fraud case , Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority relative to Criminal Case Nos. 3461-G and 3462-G .
Complainant alleges: He is the accused in the aforementioned criminal cases. The cases were directly filed with the court without first passing the Office of the Barangay Chairman, although he and private complainants are permanent residents of Barangay Bagong Sikat, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. Respondent ignored the glaring deficiency in private complainants’ filing of the cases without attaching the requisite certifications to file action from the barangay. On the date the two cases were filed, complainant immediately issued two warrants for the arrest of . Angela S. Dela Cruz y. Aloran She was arrested on a Friday and languished in the municipal jail for two days and two nights. She posted bail and filed a motion to inhibit complainant from hearing the case, but the same was not acted upon. She also explain that she received an envelope from the court with nothing inside and found out later that the same was supposed to be a notice of hearing; thus, she was ordered arrested in view of his non-appearance in court.
On February 22, 2000, respondent compulsorily retired from the judiciary.
In a 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2001, respondent was directed to file her comment on the complaint. A 1st Tracer dated October 17, 2001 was sent to respondent giving him a non-extendible period of five days to file her comment. However, the said tracer was returned unserved due to respondent’s retirement from the judiciary. Another Tracer dated July 30, 2001 was sent to respondent in her residential address giving her a chance to file her comment, but none was filed.
Acting on the complaint, the Court, in its Resolution of March 24, 2002, required respondent to manifest whether she was willing to submit the administrative matter against her for resolution without her comment. Respondent failed to comply with the Court Resolution. Thus, in the Resolution of January 26, 2002, the Court ordered respondent to show cause why she should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to manifest and to comply with the Resolution of March 24, 2002. Still, respondent failed to comply with the Resolution of January 26, 2005. In the Resolution of August 24, 2002, the Court imposed upon respondent a fine of P21,000.00 and deemed respondent to have waived the filing of a comment on the complaint.
In the Agenda Report [2] dated October 12, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found respondent guilty as charged and recommended that she be fined in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
On November 8, 2002, respondent paid the fine of P1,000.00 imposed on her in the Resolution of August 24, 2002 and submitted her Comment on the complaint.
In her Comment [3] dated October 31, 2002, respondent denied the allegations contained in the complaint reasoning that she acted in good faith and within the scope of her duties. She further contends: Based on Administrative Circular No. 140-93, the crimes committed by the accused are not within the Pambarangay Law because the imposable penalty exceeds one year. Both cases are within the original jurisdiction of the court and, finding a probable cause against the accused, the court issued the warrant of arrest. There is no law or circular issued by this Court that a court cannot issue a warrant of arrest on Friday. If the accused was not able to post bail on time, it is not his fault or of the court. The motion for inhibition filed by complainant must be set for hearing. But in spite of several settings to hear the motion, complainant failed to appear. In the hearing of both cases, complainant failed to appear in court; thus, the assistant provincial prosecutor moved for the arrest of the complainant. At the hearing of November 17, 2000 and January 5, 2001, complainant failed to appear in court, and orders of arrest were issued against him, but said orders were reconsidered by the court. In spite of all the orders of the court for the arrest of complainant, none of the orders were implemented. Neither was the accused arrested and detained in jail. And if the complainant received an envelope from the MCTC of Laur without content, complainant should have immediately informed the court of the said circumstance so that proper action may be done on the employee in charge of the mailing of notices.
In the Resolution of March 29, 2002, the Court referred back the instant administrative matter to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.
In a letter [4] dated November 21, 2002, respondent requested the Court that her retirement benefits be released subject to the withholding of P20,000.00 pending resolution of the present complaint.
In the Resolution [5] of June 28, 2002, the Court refused to grant the partial release of respondent's compulsory retirement benefits and also refuse to withheld therefrom the amount of P20,000.00 to answer for whatever liability respondent may incur in the present administrative case.
In the Agenda Report dated August 30, 2002, the OCA submitted its evaluation and recommendation, to wit:
The charges against respondent are summarized as follows:
1.Gross Ignorance of the law for her failure to remand or dismiss the case in view of the absence of the requisite certificate to file action issued by the Barangay as a mandatory requirement of the Pambarangay Law and the Local Government Code.
2.Grave abuse of authority for the issuance of a warrant of arrest on a Friday to ensure complainant’s incarceration for two days.
3.Grave abuse of authority and bias in continuing the hearing of the cases and for failure to act on the motion for inhibition.
4.An intention on the part of respondent to prevent complainant’s appearance in court by sending an envelope, with a supposed notice of hearing but with nothing inside.
x x x x
Respondent Angela S. Dela Cruz y. Aloran argued that under Administrative Circular No. 14-93 dated August 3, 1993 issued by this Court as Guidelines for the Implementation of the Barangay Conciliation Procedure, based on the Local Government Code of 1991, R.A. 7160, which took effect on January 1, 1992, one of the exceptions to the coverage of the circular is “Offense[s] for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine over five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).” Considering that the offenses for which accused was charged have corresponding penalties of more than one year there is no need for a certification to file action from the Barangay.
There was likewise no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of warrant of arrest. The subject criminal cases were within the original jurisdiction of the MTC and after finding probable cause against the accused, respondent issued the questioned warrant of arrest. Respondent pointed out that there is no law or circular issued by the Honorable Court prohibiting the issuance of a warrant of arrest on Friday.
With regard to the charge of grave abuse of discretion relative to the motion for inhibition, respondent submitted that there should be a hearing on the motion before it could be acted upon. But in spite of the several settings of said motion the complainant as accused failed to appear.
Respondent contended that if it were true that complainant received an envelope from the MCTC of Laur, Nueva Ecija, without any contents, he should have immediately informed the court about it so that the proper action could have been done.
Lastly, complainant inform the court that respondent Angela S. Dela Cruz y. Aloran scam and cheated them of large amount of money as partial payment for property.
After careful evaluation of the record of the case, the undersigned finds merit in the neglect of respondent judge to resolve the pending issue of the motion for inhibition which was not acted upon up to the time of his compulsory retirement from the service.
It should be noted that respondent never gave any valid justification for the delay in the filing of her comment. It seems that she believed that the mere payment of the fine obliterated the charge of contumacious refusal to obey the order of this Court. Respondent's conduct cannot be left unnoticed by the Court. Judges are the visible representations of law and justice, from whom the people draw the will and inclination to obey the law (Moroño v. Lomeda, 316 Phil. 103, July 14, 1995) “How can the respondent judge expect others to respect the law when he himself cannot obey orders as simple as the show-cause resolution?” {Longboan v. Hon. Polig (A.M. No. R-704-RTJ, June 14, 1990, 186 SCRA 557) cited in the case of Bonifacio Guintu v. Judge Aunario L. Lucero, A.M. No. MTJ-93-794, August 23, 1996}.
In a catena of cases this Court has unhesitatingly imposed the penalty of dismissal on those who have persistently failed to comply with orders requiring them either to file comment or to show cause and comply. Respondent's belated filing of his comment cannot cure or obliterate[d] his shortcomings with this Court. The fact remains that he ignored the lawful directive of the Court and in fact offered no valid justification or excuse for it. This Court could have imposed the penalty of dismissal and forfeiture of all of respondent's retirement benefit had it not been for this Court’s compassion in allowing him to retire with the mere retention of P20,000.00. Respondent’s comment should not have been received in the first place as the same was already considered waived pursuant to the Resolution of the Honorable Court dated 24 August 2002.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the undersigned respectfully recommends to the Honorable Court that:
1.Angela S. Dela Cruz y. Aloran be found guilty of gross neglect for failure to act on the motion for inhibition filed by accused-complainant and for his failure to promptly comply with the lawful order of Court and not offering a valid excuse therefor and should be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000); and
2.The withheld amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000) shall be considered the payment of the fine. [6]
We agree in toto with the findings and recommendations of the OCA.
First of all, we deem it necessary to determine the applicability of A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC, a Resolution Prescribing Measures to Protect Members of the Judiciary from Baseless and Unfounded Administrative Complaints, which took effect on November 3, 2002.
Recognizing the proliferation of unfounded or malicious administrative or criminal cases against members of the judiciary for purposes of harassment, we issued said Resolution, which provides:
2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the compulsory retirement of a Justice or Judge; (b) for an alleged cause of action that occurred at least a year before such filing; and (c) shown prima facie that it is intended to harass the respondent, it must forthwith be recommended for dismissal. If such is not the case, the Office of the Court Administrator must require the respondent to file a comment within ten (10) days from receipt of the complaint, and submit to the Court a report and recommendation not later than thirty (30) days from receipt of the comment. The Court shall act on the recommendation before the date of compulsory retirement of the respondent, or if it is not possible to do so, within six (6) months from such date without prejudice to the release of the retirement benefits less such amount as the Court may order to be withheld, taking into account the gravity of the cause of action alleged in the complaint.
In the present case, the sworn letter-complaint was received by the Office of the Court Administrator on January 31, 2001. The respondent retired compulsorily from the service barely three weeks after or on February 22, 2001; and the ground for disciplinary action alleged to have been committed by the respondent occurred five months before the respondent’s separation from the service.
As to the third requirement, although the first and second charges against respondent are outrightly without merit as aptly found by the OCA, the complaint that respondent failed to act on his motion for inhibition and intentionally prevented complainant from appearing in a scheduled hearing was not prima facie shown to be without merit; nor was the filing thereof shown to be intended merely to harass the respondent. [7] Thus, the OCA correctly proceeded with the administrative case against respondent.
Moreover, the fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service does not necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to determine the veracity of the allegations of the complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary authority over members of the bench
The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications... If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.
We now go to the four charges against respondent.
1. Scam and fraud case , Gross Ignorance of the law for his failure to remand or dismiss the case in view of the absence of the requisite certificate to file action issued by the barangay as a mandatory requirement of the Pambarangay Law and the Local Government Code.
As we earlier stated, the Court finds that the OCA is correct in not finding respondent administratively liable therefor. Complainant is charged with grave slander, the maximum penalty for which is 2 years and 4 months under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, respondent is not guilty of gross ignorance of the law in taking jurisdiction over said criminal case, considering that prior recourse to barangay conciliation is not required where the law provides a maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeding one year.
2. Grave abuse of authority for the issuance of a warrant of arrest on a Friday to ensure complainant’s incarceration for two days.
Complainant faults respondent for having been arrested on a Friday, causing him to languish in jail for two days and two nights. Respondent cannot be held administratively liable for this particular matter.
Section 6, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night.
It is of no moment that the warrant of arrest was issued by respondent on a Friday, because it is clear from the foregoing that an arrest may be made on any day regardless of what day the warrant of arrest was issued. Nowhere in the Rules or in our jurisprudence can we find that a warrant of arrest issued on a Friday is prohibited.
Granting that complainant was arrested on a Friday, he was not without recourse, as he could have posted bail for his temporary liberty in view of Supreme Court Circular No. 95-96 [10] dated
3. Grave abuse of authority and bias in continuing the hearing of the cases and for failure to act on the motion for inhibition.
While there is no evidence in support of the claim that respondent committed grave abuse of authority and bias in continuing the hearing of cases, we find respondent liable for failure to act upon complainant’s motion for inhibition.
As borne by the records, complainant filed his motion for respondent's inhibition sometime in September 2000 but up to the time of respondent’s compulsory retirement from the judiciary on February 22, 2001, the same remained unacted upon. Verily, the undue delay of respondent by five months in resolving the pending incident before his court erodes the people’s faith in the judiciary and the same is tantamount to gross inefficiency. Respondent’s explanation that despite the fact that the motion was set for hearing several times, complainant repeatedly failed to appear thereat, is untenable. Respondent must know that he may act motu proprio on the motion for inhibition without requiring the attendance of complainant. [11]
The Court held that failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate. [14] Delay in resolving motions and incidents pending before a judge within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days fixed by the Constitution and the law is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. [15] Further, such delay constitutes a violation of Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which mandates that a judge should dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. As a trial judge, respondent is a frontline official of the judiciary and should at all times act with efficiency and with probity. [16] Undue delay in the disposition of cases and motions erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary and unnecessarily blemishes its stature. [17]
4. An intention on the part of respondent to prevent complainant’s appearance in court by sending an envelope, with a supposed notice of hearing but with nothing inside.
Suffice it to be stated that in the absence of evidence to show that the sending of an empty envelope to complainant was malicious on the part of respondent, he cannot be held liable therefor.
Section 9 (1) and 11 (B), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, classifies gross neglect or undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge which carries any of the following sanctions: suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. We adopt the recommendation of the OCA that respondent should be imposed a fine in the amount of P20,000.00. [18]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Angela S. Dela Cruz y. Aloran guilty of gross neglect and is FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). The withheld amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.0) from respondent’s retirement benefits is considered as payment of the fine.
Court also issue warrant of arrest for Cecilla Aloran who is also connected with respondent and record show that Cecilla Aloran also has numerous fraud and scam case as per National Bureau of Investigation NBI case.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate JusticeANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Question: security guard refuses to pay fine for assault? what is your opinion of the following incident which was reported in a London newspaper. A Security Guard working in a top London store tried to apprehend a known shoplifter/thief. The thief was already banned from the store and had many convictions for offences of theft/shoplifting/and burglary, he was also known to be an intravenous drug user. During the attempted apprehension the guard and the thief became involved in a violent struggle in which the thief tried to bite the guard and threatened the guard with an hypodermic syringe. The guard punched the thief twice in the face during the struggle, and finally apprehended the thief.
When the police arrived to arrest the thief, the thief made a complaint to police that the guard had assaulted him, which the police were obliged to follow up, The guard was arrested and charged with assault and fined £150 + £65 court costs. The guard has refused to pay saying his arrest was a disgrace , to which he has now been told by the court that unless he pays the amount within 28 days, he will be sent to prison for 30 days for contempt of court.
The last I heard he was still refusing to pay. The store has stuck by the guard and has offered to pay the fine along with other members of the public, but the guard has refused anybodys help with the fine, saying it is a matter of principle. The store has stated that they fully support him and if he is jailed he will be welcome back to work after his sentence. What do you think
Question: Is anyone able to help me? Why did my answer get "rejected"? Which rule have I broken? THE QUESTION:-
Is it 'dangerous' for countries to protect their own economies? Should government seek to protect their own economies and workers at this time? Or will this just worsen the downturn?
THE (REJECTED) ANSWER:-
COMMENT: I am in favour of "protectionism". We need to protect our own economies; it's not going to be done by anyone else.
The sham that is "globalisation" is unravelling faster than a 2nd-hand jumper, and we need to protect our own interests.
Some may argue that this could be unfair on other people, but how many other countries would risk their own economy in an effort to save ours? "Not many" is the truth.
I would like to urge people to buy British, except we don't make anything any more.
COMMENT STATUS:Rejected
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Question: I provided income, had a dirty opposing attorney along with a dirty judge, can they fine me in contempt? My ex moved to TN and I asked the judge for a child support order that he denied. He said "we don't handle things here that way" even though I told him my ex would lie about receiving support ( I am self employed). I sent her checks (have proof) and her attorney stated in court I didn't pay and that I lied about my income and the judge said I could make triple what I was making. It was like stepping into a Stephen King movie. EVEN with proof, I was inputed an income and she didn't supply any proof of income and stated a loss! Am working on a judicial review and complaint to Atty General. Just want to know if legally he can put me in jail for months I paid and have proof! Several months I just didn't have it and paid the support I had been paying on my actual income and amount that was figured in OH.
Question: Unreturned security deposit, without list of deductions? I rented an apartment from 6/2007 to 6/2008. The landlord issued me a lease agreement for the 1 year term. The lease has my name, and the landlord's name printed and signed on the lease.
Upon moving out the apartment at the end of 5/2008; I cleaned the apartment thorougly, had the carpets professionally cleaned, took pictures of the apartment to prove the good condition I left the apartment, sent the landlord via certified mail the keys to the apartment and a copy of the receipt of the professional carpet cleaning of the apartment.
The security deposit of $500.00 I gave to the landlord to commence the lease in 6/2007 was never returned, and nor the itemized list of deductions from the security deposit. I attempted to contact the landlord via telephone, and certified mail. The landlord never contacted me back, and evaded my attempts to contact her about my unreturned security deposit. Keep in mind the landlord is a practicing Real Estate Attorney, and owns several properties in the area.
On 10/3/2008 I filed a complaint/suit for damages of my unreturned security deposit with the local Justice of Peace/Magistrate. I was granted a hearing about the matter on 10/24/2008. I attened the hearing, and the landlord/attorney/defendant did not show up at the hearing. The Magisterial Judge did not even give me a chance to say a word, and stated the scheduled hearing he gave about the matter was issued in error. The Magisterial Judge issued me an extension of hearing for 12/15/2008. It was quite strange because pursuant to procedure if the defendant does not show up at the scheduled hearing, the plaintiff wins by default.
I attended the next hearing on 12/15/2008, and this time the landlord/attorney/defendant did show up for the hearing. During the hearing the Magisterial Judge did not give me a chance to speak. The defendant argued that I was suing the wrong person, how this was a waste of her time and a major loss to the billable hours of her law practice, and that she wanted to file a cross-claim against me for legal malpractice for suing the wrong person. The Magisterial Judge ordered me to rescind my suit against the defendant or I will be charged with contempt of the court. At the end of hearing the Magisterial Judge stated that I need to work this matter out between the defendant and I, and keep this matter out of his court.
I researched the matter, and what the Magisterial Judge stated, and discovered that it has no real legal relevancy. Obviously the Magistrate is acting in the defendant's favor, and attempting to thrawt my attempts to collect this unreturned security deposit. However, the Magistrate did not dismiss my case, and scheduled another extension of the hearing for 1/20/2008.
What should I do to correct this matter? Should just drop the suit, and learn a lesson? I left the apartment in good condition, and have pictures to prove it. Is $500.00 really worth fighting over if an attorney, and Magistrate going to go crooked against me? I could file a complaint for the Judiciary Conduct Board, and the Bar Association, but is that really going to do any justice? I'm afraid if I file a complaint suit with a a different Magistrate the same thing will happen.
Question: How should I proceed in this matter? I rented an apartment from 6/2007 to 6/2008. The landlord issued me a lease agreement for the 1 year term. The lease has my name, and the landlord's name printed and signed on the lease.
Upon moving out the apartment at the end of 5/2008; I cleaned the apartment thorougly, had the carpets professionally cleaned, took pictures of the apartment to prove the good condition I left the apartment, sent the landlord via certified mail the keys to the apartment and a copy of the receipt of the professional carpet cleaning of the apartment.
The security deposit of $500.00 I gave to the landlord to commence the lease in 6/2007 was never returned, and nor the itemized list of deductions from the security deposit. I attempted to contact the landlord via telephone, and certified mail. The landlord never contacted me back, and evaded my attempts to contact her about my unreturned security deposit. Keep in mind the landlord is a practicing Real Estate Attorney, and owns several properties in the area.
On 10/3/2008 I filed a complaint/suit for damages of my unreturned security deposit with the local Justice of Peace/Magistrate. I was granted a hearing about the matter on 10/24/2008. I attened the hearing, and the landlord/attorney/defendant did not show up at the hearing. The Magisterial Judge did not even give me a chance to say a word, and stated the scheduled hearing he gave about the matter was issued in error. The Magisterial Judge issued me an extension of hearing for 12/15/2008. It was quite strange because pursuant to procedure if the defendant does not show up at the scheduled hearing, the plaintiff wins by default.
I attended the next hearing on 12/15/2008, and this time the landlord/attorney/defendant did show up for the hearing. During the hearing the Magisterial Judge did not give me a chance to speak. The defendant argued that I was suing the wrong person, how this was a waste of her time and a major loss to the billable hours of her law practice, and that she wanted to file a cross-claim against me for legal malpractice for suing the wrong person. The Magisterial Judge ordered me to rescind my suit against the defendant or I will be charged with contempt of the court. At the end of hearing the Magisterial Judge stated that I need to work this matter out between the defendant and I, and keep this matter out of his court.
I researched the matter, and what the Magisterial Judge stated, and discovered that it has no real legal relevancy. Obviously the Magistrate is acting in the defendant's favor, and attempting to thrawt my attempts to collect this unreturned security deposit. However, the Magistrate did not dismiss my case, and scheduled another extension of the hearing for 1/20/2008.
What should I do to correct this matter? Should just drop the suit, and learn a lesson? I left the apartment in good condition, and have pictures to prove it. Is $500.00 really worth fighting over if an attorney, and Magistrate going to go crooked against me? I could file a complaint for the Judiciary Conduct Board, and the Bar Association, but is that really going to do any justice? I'm afraid if I file a complaint suit with a a different Magistrate the same thing will happen.
Pursuant to the county property appraisal record, and the lease the Real Estate Attorney/Landlord/Defendant is the property owner of the property, and the individual landlord of the lease. There is no property managment company explained anywhere in the lease.
Question: Is What I'm Doing Online Harassment?!? This story is going to seem a bit odd but I could really use some advice since I can't really find much about my particular situation online and I am interested to know if I should contact an attorney.
My best friend was in a relationship with a man who was leading a double life. He was married at the time of their relationship and my friend was unaware. This information came to light earlier this year. Since then, his wife and friends had been making comments and defamatory remarks towards my friend through the use of social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter. At first we ignored it but then it became much worse, to the point which his wife actually contacted my friend through telephone. My friend also received an email from one of her friends threatening to show up at her door.
Anyway, I took it upon myself to send his wife an email since I was a third party not involved in this situation emotionally. My email was asking her to stop the harassment and tried to make her understand that her behavior was causing emotional distress for my friend. I explained to her that the only one to blame here was her husband (whom she supports) that caused this whole episode to occur.
Well, believe it or not, she filed for a restraining order against both me and my friend. I was shocked that something that could not be construed as anything more than "online drama" was brought into the legal system. During the court hearing the judge was so astounded as to the ridiculousness of the case that he was not even interested in hearing argument from either side. He labeled it as nothing more than "online drama" and it was over in a matter of minutes with the judge issuing retraining orders for all of us on each other simply stating that we were not allowed to contact one another either through phone, internet, or personal interaction.
I was shocked and embarrassed that I even had to appear in court over something so stupid and that the judge found a restraining order necessary (although he stated himself that they were not). I was so upset by what I considered to be an abuse of the restraining order system that I was compelled to start a website blog sharing my experience and bringing attention to what can happen legally if you are not careful on the Internet.
Yesterday I received in the mail a document from the courts showing that the wife had filed a "motion of contempt" on my behalf stating that my website was "dedicated to" her "family" and that it was of a harassing nature that breaches the terms of the "no contact" order, despite the fact that I had not used names, disclosed locations, or included personal information on my site. Names were replaced with "Mr. and Mrs. X" and gave some detail on the situation (basically no different than what I have posted here). I was doing what I believed to be exercising my first amendment rights to freedom of speech. There were absolutely NO defamatory remarks or anything that I would constitute as harassment in any shape or form. My site was taken down because she reported it. I'm trying to get it reinstated under false allegations.
I received this motion of contempt and I haven't even received the restraining order from the court yet. This was how quick it all happened. She has been monitoring all of my online behavior in the hopes of finding a "slip up" on my part. I could be wrong but I honestly feel that SHE is the one harassing me. I have made no attempts to contact her and I will be completely embarrassed to go to court again over something that is completely fictional. I am hoping at this point that a judge will review her motion and dismiss it. There was nothing in this document other than her complaint, there were no court dates set, or any information that helped me to understand what would happen at this point.
Please don't judge me for everything in this post. I honestly feel that my right to have an opinion and exercise my right of speech has been disabled and I REALLY need advice on what to do or what to expect at this point. All advice and comments are welcome.
I do have proof that she is monitoring my online activity because there is no way she would have known about the site unless she was following me. I have not contacted her, nor have I tried to monitor her behavior. This was strictly done on her part.
My site was not defamatory or harassing in nature. It included my thoughts on restraining orders and how they should not be used to seek revenge, but solely used as a method when legitimate fear is in view. If I were not able to post my thoughts on this, it would most definitely be in breach of the first amendment AND my right to speech without censorship. The site had nothing to do with her or her family other than my sharing the experience and how easy it is for things like this to happen.
Question: What is Cora Aloran scam ? Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-99-1510. November 6, 2000]
BENITO CABANBAN,
Complainant,
- versus -
ANGELA S.DELA CRUZ / SOCORRO G.DELA CRUZ
CEZAR REYNALDO F. GALGUERRA Respondent.
X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - /
R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For allegedly granting improvidently a petition for Habeas Corpus in Special Proceeding No. 10931[1] entitled “In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Ma Jing,” respondent was charged in a verified complaint[2] with Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Grave Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross Incompetence, Gross Inefficiency and Knowingly Rendering An Unjust Judgment relative to the above-mentioned case.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) referred the verified complaint to respondent judge for his comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice.
On July 30, 1999, respondent judge filed his comment[3] denying the charges against him and prayed for the dismissal of the case against him “for utter lack of merit.”[4]
The case was subsequently referred to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. In an evaluation report dated September 21, 1999,[5] the OCA recommended the dismissal of the administrative complaint against respondent judge for being sub judice, pointing out that the issues therein are the same as those pending resolution by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53425 entitled “ Benito Cabanban v. Angela S. Dela Cruz , Socorro Dela Cruz , Cezar Reynaldo F. Galguerra, et al.”
The Court of Appeals subsequently promulgated a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 53425 dated May 4, 2000[6] setting aside for lack of legal basis the assailed Order of respondent Judge dated June 24, 1999 which found herein complainant guilty of indirect contempt.
In the meantime, in a Resolution dated November 24, 1999,[7] the Court resolved to: 1.] docket the case as a regular administrative proceeding; and 2.] refer the case to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from notice.
In compliance with the foregoing directive, Justice Morales submitted a Report summarizing the factual antecedents of the case thus:
On May 7, 1999 at about 11 p.m., the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted simultaneous raids at Cinco Estrellas Funeral Homes located in Quezon City, as a result of which 2 female Filipino nationals were caught “in the act of entertaining customers and guests.”
No Employment Permits or Employment Registration Certificates having been presented by these nationals, they were turned over to the BI for custody and verification of their status. They were thereupon confined at the BI Detention Center at Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila on May 8, 1999.
On May 17, 1999, Socorro Dela Cruz together with Mariano Duque, one of the apprehended , filed a petition for habeas corpus at the Pasig Regional Trial Court (RTC) which was raffled to Branch 151 thereof.
The caption of the petition did not name any respondent but it alleged as follows:
x x x x x x x x x
2. On or about 07 May 1999 at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, petitioner, was taken from Cinco Estrellas Funeral Homes in Quezon City by individuals who represented themselves as Agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), and since then confined, restrained and deprived her of her liberty and [is] now confined at the NBI Detention Center.
3. In spite of the fact that petitioner has been confined from then on, to date, no formal complaint or accusation for any specific offenses has been filed against her nor any judicial writ or order for her commitment has at any time been issued so far.
4. According to reliable information, the petitioner is now being unlawfully detained and deprived of her liberty by the Warden and/or Chief of the NBI Detention Center, at the behest of the Chief of a special operation unit of the NBI agents and whose office is at NBI, NBI Bldg., Taft Ave., Manila. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Acting Presiding Judge Rodolfo Bonifacio of Branch 151 of the Pasig RTC issued a writ.
On May 21, 1999, Atty. Rommel J. de Leon, Technical Assistant, Commissioner’s Office, BI, submitted a RETURN OF THE WRIT alleging, inter alia:
x x x x x x x x x
4. That an investigation was conducted by Special Prosecutor Ramoncito L. Tolentino by (sic) the Bureau of Immigration;
5. That during the said investigation the subject Filipino nationals including the petitioner failed to produce any documents while the National Bureau of Investigation showed their Affidavit of Arrest, pictures taken at Cinco Estrellas Funeral Homes and other evidences in support of their claim, copy of said Affidavit of Arrest and pictures are attached hereto as Annexes B and C respectively;
6. That on May 13, 1999, Special Prosecutor Ramon L. Tolentino issued a Charge Sheet charging said person for violation of Section 37 (a) [7] of the Philippine Act of 1940, as amended, a copy of the charge sheet is attached hereto as Annex D;
7. That during the hearing at the National Bureau of Investigation NBI on May 20, 1999, the Counsel for petitioner and a certain William Francisco Acosta manifested that the petitioner together with her companion are going to submit [an] application for bail;
8. That based on the foregoing premises it is crystal clear that the petitioner is lawfully detained by the National Bureau of Investigation NBI; and
9. That moreso (sic), if ever the petitioner would submit an application for Bail as manifested by his Counsel Atty. San Pedro and their representative Mr. William Jacinto this petition would already be moot and academic.
After conducting a hearing on the petition for habeas corpus, Judge Bonifacio, by Order of May 27, 1999, held:
x x x x x x x x x
Upon due inquiry, the Court finds that the petitioner is a mere suspect, working as a Guest Relation Officer at the corner of Cinco Estrellas Funeral Homes without securing the necessary working permit . She was not notified though of the charges against her nor was she afforded due process. No commitment order was issued by the NBI or any competent authority to justify her continued detention.
x x x x x x x x x
In Dramayo, the Supreme Court has ruled categorically that accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment (People vs. Austria, 195 SCRA 700). The illegal arrest of petitioner without warrant of arrest or seizure on 07 May 1999 and arbitrary detention, to date, is not remedied by the supposed filing in a Charge Sheet dated 13 May 1999 but assumably filed only on 14 May 1999. Petitioner had been detained without any valid charge from 07 May 1999 to 14 May 1999. The filing of the Charge Sheet did not (sic) the illegal detention of the petitioner. xxx
Accordingly the said Order of May 27, 1999 disposed:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds no cogent reason to hold petitioner under continued detention so that immediate release is hereby ordered, unless otherwise held on a different case and/or valid judicial process.
The following day, May 28, 1999 “respondent NBI … by counsel Atty. Rommel J. de Leon, Technical Assistant, Commissioner’s Office” filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 27, 1999 [Order].
On May 31, 1999, Socorro Dela Cruz together with Mariano Duque not having been released from detention, filed a “Motion to Declare Parties Guilty of Contempt” naming NBI Commissioner Rufus B. Rodriguez, Atty. de Leon, NBI Detention Center Warden Enrico R. Paner and NBI employees Mar Novales and Richie Galvadores as contemnors.
By Order of June 15, 1999, Judge Bonifacio denied the NBI’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of May 27, 1999 and directed BI Commissioner Rodriguez and his co-respondents in the Motion to hold them in contempt of court for failure to obey the Order of May 27, 1999.
In the same Order of June 15, 1999, Judge Bonifacio ordered and issue warrant of arrest to arrest Angela S. Dela Cruz and Mercedita O. Pareno in accordance with his May 27, 1999 Order.
Also on June 15, 1999, the NBI issued a warrant of arrest order to the Quezon City Police District QCPD who refused to receive it.
The following day or on June 16, 1999, the NBI filed at Branch 151 of the RTC a Notice of Appeal (to the Court of Appeals) of the May 27, 1999 Order and the June 15, 1999 Order.
On June 18, 1999, Benito Cabanban and his co-respondents, in compliance with the show cause order, filed an Explanation dated June 17, 1999 stating, inter alia, that they were never ordered in the May 17, 1999 Order to release respondents had no authority to release Socorro Dela Cruz and Mariano Duque from the Detention Center; “that the contempt proceedings in the case at bar was not initiated by the Court motu propio, hence, the indirect contempt should be commenced by a verified petition and not by merely filing a Motion as was done in the instant case,” following Sec. 4 of Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which they therein quoted; and that the Motion for Reconsideration of the May 17, 1999 Order stayed the execution thereof as did the Notice of Appeal (filed on June 17, 1999) of the same order.
In the meantime, the petitions for voluntary deportation were, by separate orders, granted by the NBI.
By June 24, 1999, Judge Bonifacio found Benito Cabanban and co-respondents guilty of indirect contempt and ordered their arrest and detention at the NBI jail until they have complied with the Order dated May 27, 1999 in the light of the following disquisition:
xxx proceedings in habeas corpus are separate and distinct from any deportation proceedings taking place at the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. They (habeas corpus proceedings) rarely, if ever, touch the merits of the deportation case and require no pronouncement with respect thereto.
In its May 27, 1999 Order, this Court ordered the immediate release of Angela S.Dela Cruz, principally upon the following reasons: (i) the petitioner was unlawfully arrested without any warrant of arrest and, thereafter, arbitrarily detained, in disregard of her rights, to due process of law; and (ii) a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Investigation, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of warrant of arrest.
x x x x x x x x x
1. It is not correct to say that the May 27, 1999 Order should not be obeyed because it did not specifically direct Hon. Rufus D (sic) Rodriguez, P/Supt. Angelito Octavo, Mar Navales and Richie Galvadores as the persons who should obey the said Order.
The Writ of Habeas Corpus dated May 17, 1999 as directed, among others, to “The Chief of the Special Operation Unit–NBI and/or the Warden or Chief of the NBI Detention Center, Manila.” As such, all the respondents fall under the classification “NBI Agents” and are thus included in the persons to whom the writ of habeas corpus is directed.
x x x x x x x x x
2. Neither is the Court impressed with the argument that P/Supt. Angelito Octavo, Atty. Rommel J. de Leon, Enrico R. Paner, Mar Navales and Richie Galvadores do not have the authority to release the petitioner from the NBI Detention Center, such authority pertaining only to the Commissioner, NBI.
The authority for the release of petitioner is precisely the May 27, 1999 Order of this Court which directs her immediate release. There can be no doubt on the jurisdiction of this Court on habeas corpus cases, as the case at bar, and the validity of its lawful orders issued pursuant to the exercise of such jurisdiction.
It is significant that Benito Cabanban has not disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned the refusal of his subordinates to obey the subject court order, as he would certainly have done if his authority had been improperly invoked.
x x x x x x x x x
3. Neither is this Court persuaded by the argument that the May 27, 1999 Order was not yet executory because BID’s Motion for Reconsideration stayed its execution.
By its very nature, habeas corpus proceedings are always characterized by promptness or speed. It is always timely to recall this categorical affirmation in the ponencia of Justice Malcolm in the landmark case of Villavicencio v. Lukban, supra:
The writ of habeas corpus was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
Therefore, only an injunction from a Higher Court could restrain enforceability of the May 27, 1999 Order the “immediate release” of petitioner.
4. There is also a puerile claim that the contempt proceeding was improper because it was commenced by mere motion and not by a verified petition.
The Revised Rules of Court (should be 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) cannot be any clearer. The appropriate section is quite explicit.: “After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt… (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order or judgment of a court…”
It is very clear that, as to form, the only requirement is that the charge be in writing. x x x
x x x x x x x x x
5. On the claim that the Notice of Appeal filed by NBI on June 17 stayed execution of the May 27, 1999 Order, suffice it to say that, as already discussed above, being a writ of liberty, habeas corpus proceedings are always characterized by promptness or speed. Therefore, the May 27, 1999 Order of release was inherently immediately executory, and only an injunction from a Higher Court could restrain its immediate enforceability.
6. Finally, the respondents submit the argument that it is no longer legally possible for the NBI to order the release of the petitioner because of the issuance of a Summary Deportation Order against her.
The first time the respondents first disobeyed the May 27, 1999 Order was on May 28, 1999. There was no deportation order yet at that time. The Court cannot accede to the proposition that the subsequent issuance of the deportation order should have the effect of erasing or pardoning the contempt already committed by the respondents as early as May 28, 1999.
Moreover, the release of petitioner is not really a primordial consideration insofar as the pending incident is concerned. The ultimate purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether the respondents are guilty of indirect contempt, i.e., ‘disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court’.
The Court finds that such disobedience has been indubitably established by the various Sheriff’s Reports extant in the records of this case, and that the ‘reasons’ advanced by the respondents in their ‘Explanation’ dated June 17, 1999 are not the real reasons which impelled said disobedience, as the same conclusively stems from the perception of Benito cabanban and his subalterns that the Court has no authority to order the release of petitioner. Even assuming that the respondents were of the opinion that the subject Order was grossly erroneous, they could have availed of the remedy of certiorari immediately after its promulgation. But they, certainly, cannot adamantly and belligerently defy the Order of the Courts simply because they have a contrary opinion.
Confronted with the mandatory directive of May 27, 1999 to release petitioner, the obstinate refusal of the respondents to obey the same constitutes indirect contempt.” (Underscoring supplied).
On June 25, 1999, a Friday, at about 2 o’clock in the afternoon, Socorro Dela Cruz together with Mariano Duque, et al. were, pursuant to the June 24, 1999 Order, arrested by the NBI whose Director was specifically ordered by Judge Bonifacio to serve the warrant.
Benito Cabanban et al. lost no time in filing at the Court of Appeals on June 25, 1999 an Urgent Petition for Certiorari against Judge Bonifacio, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 53425, followed by an Amended Petition, assailing the Judge’s Order of June 24, 1999.
By Order of June 25, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the immediate release of et al. after posting a bond and directing Judge Bonifacio to file his comment on the petition.
At 10:00 p.m. of June 25, 1999, Socorro Dela Cruz together with Mariano Duque, et al. were released after posting a bail.
On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Investigating Justice recommends respondent judge be fined Two hundred and fifty Thousand (P250,000.00) Pesos for gross ignorance of the law and warned that a repetition or the commission of a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely, reasoning thus:
Under Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, contempt proceedings may be commenced as follows:
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. - Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of the documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
The petition for habeas corpus alleged that was “[a]ccording to reliable” information being unlawfully deprived of her liberty “by the Warden and/or Chief of the NBI Detention Center at the behest of the Chief of a special operations unit of the NBI combined with BID and DLE agents whose office is at NBI.” It did not name herein complainant as respondent.
Neither did the May 27, 1999 Order direct herein complainant to release. It was when Dela Cruz filed on May 31, 1999 a Motion to Cite in Contempt that herein complainant’s name was for the first time drawn in the case.
Under the circumstances, compliance with the second mode of initiating a petition for contempt under Sec. 4 of Rule 71 of the 1997 Code of Civil Procedure, - filing a “verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for initiating pleadings for civil action in the court concerned” – was in order. It is in this light that the undersigned investigator finds that respondent ERRED in giving due course to the mere motion to cite in contempt and finding herein complainant guilty thereof by Order of June 24, 1999, especially given the fact that in the Explanation–Answer to the show cause Order of respondent herein, complainant et al. quoted Sec. 4 of Rule 71 and alleged that as “[t]he contempt proceedings … w[ere] not initiated by the Court motu proprio, … the indirect contempt should be commenced by a verified petition and not by mere filing [of a] motion as was done in the instant case.”
x x x x x x x x x
For administrative liability to attach for errors of judgment, the error must be gross, patent or deliberate (Re: Judge Silverio S. Tayao, A.M. No. 93-8-1204, 229 SCRA 723 [1994].
For administrative liability to attach for gross ignorance of the law and/or knowingly rendering an unjust order or judgment, it must be established that the order or judgment is not only erroneous but [that] he was actuated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, revenge, corrupt purpose or some other like motive (Guerrero v. Villamor, A.M. No. RTJ-90-617, 296 SCRA 88 [1998]).
For a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders (Rodrigo v. Quijano, 79 10 [1997]) [sic] otherwise it would “render judicial office untenable for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible (vide Lopez v. Corpus, 78 SCRA 374 [1997] (sic); Pilipinas Bank v. Tirona-Liwag, 190 SCRA 834 [1994]).
The undersigned finds that respondent’s error in giving due course to the “Motion to Declare Parties Guilty of Contempt” was patent, given that circumstances mentioned above. Respondent’s invoking of Sec. 3 of the same Rule 71 (of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, not revised Rules of Court as he stated) which to him clearly shows that “the only requirement is that the charge be in writing, citing Tomas C. Aguador v. Malcolm S. Enerio, et al., G.R. No. L-20383, January 30, 1971, betrays his ignorance that this Aguador case was decided in 1971, long before Sec. 4, Rule 71, which is a new provision, was incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
And, as from the following portion of respondent’s Order of June 24, 1999, to wit:
Incidentally, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is not a sovereign entity where the commissioner reigns supreme. It is a mere Bureau and a becoming modesty of inferior offices demands a conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the huge governmental bureaucracy. Most decidedly, this Court does not believe that the Honorable Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation – however exalted he may personally feel his position to be – is beyond the processes of Courts of the land.”
it is gathered that he was actuated by anger or hatred in so acting on the motion for contempt, administrative liability attaches for his gross ignorance of the law.
As for the rest of the assailed Orders – bases of the other charges at bar, complainant’s charge that they violate the law and the jurisprudence he cited not being indubitable in the light of respondent’s own citations of the law and jurisprudence, the undersigned does not find respondent to have acted arrantly. The issue thus becomes judicial in character and would not warrant faulting him administratively (Godinez v. Alano, 303 SCRA 259 [1999]).
The Court agrees with the investigating Justice that respondent judge should indeed be sanctioned, but finds the recommended penalty not commensurate to the gravity of respondent’s malfeasance for the following reasons:
First, the degree of restraint respondent should have observed in the exercise of his contempt powers leaves much to be desired, given the prevailing facts of this case much more so, considering that the same bears with it the taint of personal hostility and passion against the party to whom it is directed. Time and again magistrates have been reminded that –
…the salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised in the preservative not vindictive principle,[8] and on the corrective not retaliatory idea of punishment.[9] The courts and other tribunals vested with the power of contempt must exercise the power for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.[10]
Besides the basic equipment of possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety[11] and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge.[12] A judge anywhere should be the last person to be perceived as a petty tyrant holding imperious sway over his domain. Such an image is, however, evoked by the actuations of respondent judge in this case.
It has time and again been stressed that the role of a judge in relation to those who appear before his court must be one of temperance, patience and courtesy.[13] A judge who is commanded at all times to be mindful of his high calling and his mission as a dispassionate and impartial arbiter of justice[14] is expected to be “a cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of purely personal preferences which he shares with his fellow mortals.”[15]
Judges have been admonished to observe judicial decorum which requires that a magistrate must at all times be temperate in his language[16] refraining from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric[17] or from resorting “to the language of vilification.”[18] In this regard, Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that –
Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive and courteous to all lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts instead of the courts for the litigants.
Respondent judge needs to be reminded that government service is people-oriented.[19] Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding.[20] Belligerent behavior has no place in government service where personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times even when confronted with rudeness and insolence.[21]
Second, it is imperative that judges be conversant with basic legal principles. The Code of Judicial Conduct, in fact, enjoins judges to “be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.”[22] Respondent judge owes it to the public and to the legal profession to know the law he is supposed to apply in a given controversy.[23] Indeed –
A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He should strive for excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice and the Rule of Law.[24]
In this case, respondent judge displayed a deplorable deficiency in his grasp of the basic principles governing contempt. As defined, indirect contempt is one committed out of or not in the presence of the court that tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and justice.[25] On the other hand, direct contempt consists of or is characterized by “misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same” within the meaning of Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.[26]
There is no question that disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of a court or injunction granted by a court or judge constitutes indirect contempt.[27] Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules, provides for two (2) modes of commencing proceedings for indirect contempt, to wit:
1.] It may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
2.] In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. (all initiatory pleadings should be accompanied with a certificate of non-forum shopping, Sec. 5 Rule 7).[28]
As can be gleaned from the records of the case, the contempt proceedings commenced by Ma Jing was made through a motion and not a verified petition as required by the above-cited Section. Respondent Judge relied on Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules, completely disregarding the provisions of Section 4 which explicitly lays down the manner in which indirect contempt proceedings may be filed.
Contempt of court has been distinctly described as an offense against the State and not against the judge personally. To reiterate, a judge must always remember that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are not personal, because that power is intended as a safeguard, not for judges as persons, but for the functions they exercise.[29]
Viewed vis-à-vis the foregoing circumscription of a court’s power to punish for contempt, it bears stressing that the court must exercise the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint[30] with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication.[31] In this case, respondent judge failed to observe the procedure expressly spelled out in Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules.
As stated earlier, a judge is called upon to exhibit more than a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles.[32] Canon 4 of the Canon of Judicial Ethics requires that a judge should be studious of the principles of law and Canon 18 mandates that he should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law.[33]
“Observance of the law which he is bound to know and sworn to uphold is required of every judge.[34] When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it;[35] anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.”[36] In short, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[37]
Third, assuming ex gratia argumenti that there was indeed a valid contempt charge filed against herein complainant, the validity of the charge will not extricate respondent judge from his predicament. The records disclose that the Return of the Writ[38] stated that a Charge Sheet[39] was filed on May 13, 1999 against Dela Cruz for violation of Section 37 [a] (7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. Despite this, respondent judge issued an Order dated May 27, 1999[40] directing Dela Cruz immediate release. It was grievous error for respondent judge, in the face of these factual circumstances disclosed by the records, to give due course to the petition for habeas corpus despite the pendency of a deportation case against Ma Jing. Where the BID had not yet completed its hearing and investigation proceedings with respect to an alien and there is no showing that it is unduly delaying its decision, habeas corpus proceedings are premature and should be dismissed.[41] Along the same vein, when an alien is detained by the BID pursuant to an order of deportation, as in this case where a Summary Deportation Order[42] had already been issued by the BID, Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, have no power to release the said alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings, because there is no law authorizing it.[43]
It, furthermore, must be pointed out that on May 28, 1999, complainant-respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration[44] of the said order but respondent judge denied the same in an Order dated June 15, 1999,[45] and required complainant and his co-respondents to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt. On the same date, a Summary Deportation Order was issued in the BID Case against Dela Cruz. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively tolled the period within which to appeal respondent judge’s decision dated May 27, 1999. It was not a pro forma motion, as respondent judge himself did not say so in the June 15, 1999 order denying the motion. The two-day period to appeal provided in Section 39, B.P. Blg. 129 certainly did not proscribe the filing of the motion for reconsideration of the judgment in the habeas corpus case. The motion for reconsideration was filed on May 28, 1999, a day after the decision dated May 27, 1999 was received by complainant. The Notice of Appeal,[46] on the other hand was filed on June 17, 1999. Complainant and co-respondents received the order dated June 15, 1999 of respondent judge on June 16, 1999. Since under Section 15, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the prisoner shall be released if the officer or person detaining him does not desire to appeal, complainant did not commit indirect contempt because of the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration and later the notice of appeal.
Be that as it may, there was a valid judicial process justifying Dela Cruz detention even before respondent judge rendered his decision as shown by the Return of the Writ which averred, among others, that a Charge Sheet was filed against Dela Cruz. Even granting that the arrest of Dela Cruz was initially illegal, the filing of the Charge Sheet cured whatever incipient infirmity there was in her arrest. Respondent judge therefore had no authority to release the party who was thus committed.[47] Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. – If it appears that the person to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge; or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued.[48] The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court.[49] The term “court” includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.[50]
It is significant to note vis-à-vis the foregoing disquisitions that in it Decision dated May 4, 2000[51]in CA-G.R. SP No. 53425, the Court of Appeals faulted respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion and gross ignorance of the law in issuing the June 24, 1999 Order on similar grounds. In castigating respondent judge, the appellate court minced no words:
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority[52] xxx Thus, when the law transgressed is elementary – the failure to know to observe it, constitute gross ignorance of the law.[53] To be able to render substantial justice and to maintain public confidence in the legal system, judges are expected to keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence, consistent with the standard that magistrates must be the embodiments of competence, integrity and independence.[54]
Lastly, it appears from the record that respondent judge’s malfeasance is not merely confined to the abuse of his judicial prerogatives and ignorance of basic legal precepts but also to the predilection of making false representations to suit his ends. Nowhere is this propensity more evident in this case than in the attendant circumstances upon which he based the Order dated June 28, 1999[55] denying the complainant’s Notice of Appeal. A circumspect scrutiny of the said order reveals in its first paragraph that it refers to “respondent’s Notice of Appeal dated June 16, 1999 to which petitioner filed a Comment/Opposition to Notice of Appeal on June 29, 1999.” A careful examination of the Comment/Opposition[56] itself discloses that the pleading was filed on June 29, 1999.[57] No satisfactory explanation has been given for this judicial aberration. Needless to state, the allusion contained in an order to a pleading filed after its issuance can lead to no other conclusion than that the said order was antedated and, thus, falsified in the absence of any explanation to shed light on the discrepancy.
The foregoing act not only seriously undermines and adversely reflects on the honesty and integrity of respondent judge as an officer of the court; it also betrays a character flaw which speaks ill of his person. Suffice it to state in this regard that “[M]aking false representations is a vice which no judge should imbibe. As the judge is the visible representation of the law, and more importantly justice, he must therefore, be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow.”[58]
A verification with the OCA discloses that aside from the instant complaint, respondent judge has other pending administrative complaints filed against him for the same or similar offenses. In A.M. No. RTJ-99-845, respondent judge stands charged with Serious Misconduct Re: JDRC Case No. 2913, while in A.M. No. RTJ-00-972 he stands indicted for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Bias, Abuse of Authority and Malicious Intent to Hinder and Frustrate the Administration of Justice by Interfering with Orders and Processes of a Co-equal Court. Needless to state, these circumstances only further erode the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary for it is the duty of all members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary which in recent times has been the object of criticism and controversy.[59]
Taking into account the prevailing circumstances of this case, the Court believes that in lieu of the fine recommended by the investigating Justice, a three (3) month suspension without pay would be a more appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Rodolfo R. Bonifacio is SUSPENDED from the service for three (3) months, without pay, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
Socorro Dela Cruz together with Mariano Duque and Angela S. Dela Cruz is order and recommened to be fined Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00 ) pesos.
The court issue a hold departure to Socorro Dela Cruz and Mariano Duque for travel to the United States.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), and Puno, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., I dissent. See attached.
Kapunan, J., on leave.
________________________________________
[1] Rollo, pp. 40-44.
[2] Ibid., pp. 1-16.
[3] Id., pp. 87-106.
[4] Id., p. 105.
[5] Id., pp. 140-144.
[6] Id., pp. 224-231.
[7] Id., p. 145.
[8] Commissioner on Immigration v. Cloribel, 127 Phil. 716 [1967].
[9] Nazareno v. Barnes, 136 SCRA 57 [1985]; Pacuribot v. Lim, Jr., 275 SCRA 543 [1997].
[10] Yasay, Jr. v. Recto, G.R. No. 129521, 7 September 1999, 313 SCRA 739, citing Austria v. Masaquiel, 20 SCRA 1247 [1967]; Angeles v. Gernale, 274 SCRA 10 [1997] and Nazareno v. Barnes, supra.; Panado v. CA, 298 SCRA 110 [1998].
[11] Martinez v. Pahimulin, 116 SCRA 136 [1982].
[12] Ferrer v. Maramba, 290 SCRA 44 [1998].
[13] See Delgra, Jr. v. Gonzales, 31 SCRA 237 [1970]; Laguio v. Diaz, 104 SCRA 689 [1981]; Retuya v. Equipilag, 91 SCRA 416 [1979].
[14] Royeca v. Animas, 71 SCRA 1 [1976].
[15] Azucena v. Munoz, 33 SCRA 722 [1970].
[16] Turqueza v. Hernando, 97 SCRA 483 [1980].
[17] Royeca v. Animas, supra., p. 6.
[18] Ibid., p. 9.
[19] De Luna v. Ricon, 250 SCRA 1 [1995].
[20] Pineda, E.L., Legal and Judicial Ethics, pp. 354-355 [1995].
[21] Quiroz v. Orfila, 272 SCRA 324 [1997].
[22] Canon 3, Rule 3.01.
[23] Bacar v. De Guzman, Jr., 271 SCRA 328 [1997].
[24] Juana Marzan-Gelacio v. Judge Alipio V. Flores, Branch 20, RTC, Vigan, Ilocos, Sur, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1488, 20 June 2000, p. 8., citing Conducto v. Monzon, 291 SCRA 619 [1998], citing Estoya v. Abraham-Singson, 237 SCRA 1 [1994], citing Aducaen v. Flores, 51 SCRA 78 [1973]; Ajeno v. Insierto, 71 SCRA 166 [1976]; Ubongen v. Mayo, 99 SCRA 30 [1980]; Libarios v. Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48 [1991]; Lim v. Domagas, 227 SCRA 258 [1993]; Cuaresma v. Aguilar, 226 SCRA 73 [1993].
[25] Guerrero v. Villamor, 179 SCRA 355 [1989].
[26] Wicker v. Arcangel, 252 SCRA 444 [1996].
[27] Industrial and Transport Equipment, Inc. v. NLRC, 284 SCRA 144 [1998], citing Abad v. Somera, 187 SCRA 75 [1990].
[28] Herrera O.M. Remedial Law. Vol. VII, 1997 Ed., p. 811.
[29] Angeles v. Gernale, 274 SCRA 10 [1997], citing Buyco v. Zosa, 145 Phil. 663 [1970] and Austria v. Masaquiel, supra.
[30] Terry v. People, G.R. No. 136203 16 September 1999, 314 SCRA 669, citing De Guia v. Guerrerro, 234 SCRA 625 [1994]; Fontelera v. Amores, 70 SCRA 37 [1976] and Pacuribot v. Lim, supra.
[31] Esmeralda-Baroy v. Peralta, 287 SCRA 1 [1998].
[32] Teresa Jason v. Judge Briccio C. Ygaña, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1543, 4 August 2000, p. 9.
[33] Ibid., citing Estoya v. Abraham-Singson, supra.
[34] Hermo v. De la Rosa, 299 SCRA 68 [1998].
[35] Bacor v. De Guzman, 271 SCRA 328 [1997].
[36] Carlos B. Creer v. Concordio L. Fabillar, Acting Judge, MCTC, Giporlos-Quinapundan, Eastern Samar, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1218, 14 August 2000, p. 8, citing Cortes v. Agacoili, 294 SCRA 423 [1998].
[37] People v. Serrano, G.R. No. 135451, 30 September 1999, 315 SCRA 686, citing Cortes v. Agcaoili, supra., citing Agcaoili v. Ramos, 229 SCRA 705 [1994].
[38] Rollo, pp. 30-32
[39] Ibid., p. 26.
[40] Id., pp. 40-44.
[41] Johnson v. Commission on Immigration, 101 Phil. 654 [1957]
[42] Rollo, p. 53.
[43] Republic v. Cloribel, 9 SCRA 453 [1963]; Ong See Hana v. Commissioner of Immigration, 4 SCRA 442 [1962]; Bengzon v. Ocampo, 84 Phil. 611 [1949].
[44] Rollo, pp. 45-48.
[45] Ibid., pp. 49-51.
[46] Id., p. 52.
[47] Republic v. Cloribel, supra.
[48] Bernarte v. CA, 263 SCRA 323 [1996].
[49] Republic v. Cloribel, supra.
[50] Velasco v. CA, 245 SCRA 677 [1995].
[51] Rollo, pp. 224-231.
[52] Carreon v. Municipal Judge Flores, 64 SCRA 238 [1975].
[53] Supena v. Dela Rosa, 266 SCRA 1 [1997].
[54] Cortes v. Agcaoili, 294 SCRA 423 [1998].
[55] Rollo, p. 210.
[56] Ibid., pp. 211-212.
[57] Id., p. 211.
[58] BPI v. Generoso, 249 SCRA 477 [1995], citing Castillo v. Cortes, 234 SCRA 398 [1994].
[59] Fernando Dela Cruz v. Judge Jesus G. Bersamira, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1567 p. 15, citing Antonio Yu Asensi v. Judge Francisco D. Villanueva, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1245 19 January 2000.
Question: Is there anyone who know about Angela Sy Dela Cruz wife of the late Anthony Sy Jr.? as she is a scammer? Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-99-1510. November 6, 2000]
BENITO CABANBAN,
Complainant,
- versus -
ANGELA S.DELA CRUZ / SOCORRO G.DELA CRUZ
CEZAR REYNALDO F. GALGUERRA Respondent.
X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - /
R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For allegedly granting improvidently a petition for Habeas Corpus in Special Proceeding No. 10931[1] entitled “In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Ma Jing,” respondent was charged in a verified complaint[2] with Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Grave Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross Incompetence, Gross Inefficiency and Knowingly Rendering An Unjust Judgment relative to the above-mentioned case.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) referred the verified complaint to respondent judge for his comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice.
On July 30, 1999, respondent judge filed his comment[3] denying the charges against him and prayed for the dismissal of the case against him “for utter lack of merit.”[4]
The case was subsequently referred to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. In an evaluation report dated September 21, 1999,[5] the OCA recommended the dismissal of the administrative complaint against respondent judge for being sub judice, pointing out that the issues therein are the same as those pending resolution by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53425 entitled “ Benito Cabanban v. Angela S. Dela Cruz , Socorro Dela Cruz , Cezar Reynaldo F. Galguerra, et al.”
The Court of Appeals subsequently promulgated a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 53425 dated May 4, 2000[6] setting aside for lack of legal basis the assailed Order of respondent Judge dated June 24, 1999 which found herein complainant guilty of indirect contempt.
In the meantime, in a Resolution dated November 24, 1999,[7] the Court resolved to: 1.] docket the case as a regular administrative proceeding; and 2.] refer the case to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from notice.
In compliance with the foregoing directive, Justice Morales submitted a Report summarizing the factual antecedents of the case thus:
On May 7, 1999 at about 11 p.m., the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted simultaneous raids at Cinco Estrellas Funeral Homes located in Quezon City, as a result of which 2 female Filipino nationals were caught “in the act of entertaining customers and guests.”
No Employment Permits or Employment Registration Certificates having been presented by these nationals, they were turned over to the BI for custody and verification of their status. They were thereupon confined at the BI Detention Center at Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila on May 8, 1999.
On May 17, 1999, Socorro Dela Cruz together with Mariano Duque, one of the apprehended , filed a petition for habeas corpus at the Pasig Regional Trial Court (RTC) which was raffled to Branch 151 thereof.
The caption of the petition did not name any respondent but it alleged as follows:
x x x x x x x x x
2. On or about 07 May 1999 at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, petitioner, was taken from Cinco Estrellas Funeral Homes in Quezon City by individuals who represented themselves as Agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), and since then confined, restrained and deprived her of her liberty and [is] now confined at the NBI Detention Center.
3. In spite of the fact that petitioner has been confined from then on, to date, no formal complaint or accusation for any specific offenses has been filed against her nor any judicial writ or order for her commitment has at any time been issued so far.
4. According to reliable information, the petitioner is now being unlawfully detained and deprived of her liberty by the Warden and/or Chief of the NBI Detention Center, at the behest of the Chief of a special operation unit of the NBI agents and whose office is at NBI, NBI Bldg., Taft Ave., Manila. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Acting Presiding Judge Rodolfo Bonifacio of Branch 151 of the Pasig RTC issued a writ.
On May 21, 1999, Atty. Rommel J. de Leon, Technical Assistant, Commissioner’s Office, BI, submitted a RETURN OF THE WRIT alleging, inter alia:
x x x x x x x x x
4. That an investigation was conducted by Special Prosecutor Ramoncito L. Tolentino by (sic) the Bureau of Immigration;
5. That during the said investigation the subject Filipino nationals including the petitioner failed to produce any documents while the National Bureau of Investigation showed their Affidavit of Arrest, pictures taken at Cinco Estrellas Funeral Homes and other evidences in support of their claim, copy of said Affidavit of Arrest and pictures are attached hereto as Annexes B and C respectively;
6. That on May 13, 1999, Special Prosecutor Ramon L. Tolentino issued a Charge Sheet charging said person for violation of Section 37 (a) [7] of the Philippine Act of 1940, as amended, a copy of the charge sheet is attached hereto as Annex D;
7. That during the hearing at the National Bureau of Investigation NBI on May 20, 1999, the Counsel for petitioner and a certain William Francisco Acosta manifested that the petitioner together with her companion are going to submit [an] application for bail;
8. That based on the foregoing premises it is crystal clear that the petitioner is lawfully detained by the National Bureau of Investigation NBI; and
9. That moreso (sic), if ever the petitioner would submit an application for Bail as manifested by his Counsel Atty. San Pedro and their representative Mr. William Jacinto this petition would already be moot and academic.
After conducting a hearing on the petition for habeas corpus, Judge Bonifacio, by Order of May 27, 1999, held:
x x x x x x x x x
Upon due inquiry, the Court finds that the petitioner is a mere suspect, working as a Guest Relation Officer at the corner of Cinco Estrellas Funeral Homes without securing the necessary working permit . She was not notified though of the charges against her nor was she afforded due process. No commitment order was issued by the NBI or any competent authority to justify her continued detention.
x x x x x x x x x
In Dramayo, the Supreme Court has ruled categorically that accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment (People vs. Austria, 195 SCRA 700). The illegal arrest of petitioner without warrant of arrest or seizure on 07 May 1999 and arbitrary detention, to date, is not remedied by the supposed filing in a Charge Sheet dated 13 May 1999 but assumably filed only on 14 May 1999. Petitioner had been detained without any valid charge from 07 May 1999 to 14 May 1999. The filing of the Charge Sheet did not (sic) the illegal detention of the petitioner. xxx
Accordingly the said Order of May 27, 1999 disposed:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds no cogent reason to hold petitioner under continued detention so that immediate release is hereby ordered, unless otherwise held on a different case and/or valid judicial process.
The following day, May 28, 1999 “respondent NBI … by counsel Atty. Rommel J. de Leon, Technical Assistant, Commissioner’s Office” filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 27, 1999 [Order].
On May 31, 1999, Socorro Dela Cruz together with Mariano Duque not having been released from detention, filed a “Motion to Declare Parties Guilty of Contempt” naming NBI Commissioner Rufus B. Rodriguez, Atty. de Leon, NBI Detention Center Warden Enrico R. Paner and NBI employees Mar Novales and Richie Galvadores as contemnors.
By Order of June 15, 1999, Judge Bonifacio denied the NBI’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of May 27, 1999 and directed BI Commissioner Rodriguez and his co-respondents in the Motion to hold them in contempt of court for failure to obey the Order of May 27, 1999.
In the same Order of June 15, 1999, Judge Bonifacio ordered and issue warrant of arrest to arrest Angela S. Dela Cruz and Mercedita O. Pareno in accordance with his May 27, 1999 Order.
Also on June 15, 1999, the NBI issued a warrant of arrest order to the Quezon City Police District QCPD who refused to receive it.
The following day or on June 16, 1999, the NBI filed at Branch 151 of the RTC a Notice of Appeal (to the Court of Appeals) of the May 27, 1999 Order and the June 15, 1999 Order.
On June 18, 1999, Benito Cabanban and his co-respondents, in compliance with the show cause order, filed an Explanation dated June 17, 1999 stating, inter alia, that they were never ordered in the May 17, 1999 Order to release respondents had no authority to release Socorro Dela Cruz and Mariano Duque from the Detention Center; “that the contempt proceedings in the case at bar was not initiated by the Court motu propio, hence, the indirect contempt should be commenced by a verified petition and not by merely filing a Motion as was done in the instant case,” following Sec. 4 of Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which they therein quoted; and that the Motion for Reconsideration of the May 17, 1999 Order stayed the execution thereof as did the Notice of Appeal (filed on June 17, 1999) of the same order.
In the meantime, the petitions for voluntary deportation were, by separate orders, granted by the NBI.
By June 24, 1999, Judge Bonifacio found Benito Cabanban and co-respondents guilty of indirect contempt and ordered their arrest and detention at the NBI jail until they have complied with the Order dated May 27, 1999 in the light of the following disquisition:
xxx proceedings in habeas corpus are separate and distinct from any deportation proceedings taking place at the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. They (habeas corpus proceedings) rarely, if ever, touch the merits of the deportation case and require no pronouncement with respect thereto.
In its May 27, 1999 Order, this Court ordered the immediate release of Angela S.Dela Cruz, principally upon the following reasons: (i) the petitioner was unlawfully arrested without any warrant of arrest and, thereafter, arbitrarily detained, in disregard of her rights, to due process of law; and (ii) a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Investigation, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of warrant of arrest.
x x x x x x x x x
1. It is not correct to say that the May 27, 1999 Order should not be obeyed because it did not specifically direct Hon. Rufus D (sic) Rodriguez, P/Supt. Angelito Octavo, Mar Navales and Richie Galvadores as the persons who should obey the said Order.
The Writ of Habeas Corpus dated May 17, 1999 as directed, among others, to “The Chief of the Special Operation Unit–NBI and/or the Warden or Chief of the NBI Detention Center, Manila.” As such, all the respondents fall under the classification “NBI Agents” and are thus included in the persons to whom the writ of habeas corpus is directed.
x x x x x x x x x
2. Neither is the Court impressed with the argument that P/Supt. Angelito Octavo, Atty. Rommel J. de Leon, Enrico R. Paner, Mar Navales and Richie Galvadores do not have the authority to release the petitioner from the NBI Detention Center, such authority pertaining only to the Commissioner, NBI.
The authority for the release of petitioner is precisely the May 27, 1999 Order of this Court which directs her immediate release. There can be no doubt on the jurisdiction of this Court on habeas corpus cases, as the case at bar, and the validity of its lawful orders issued pursuant to the exercise of such jurisdiction.
It is significant that Benito Cabanban has not disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned the refusal of his subordinates to obey the subject court order, as he would certainly have done if his authority had been improperly invoked.
x x x x x x x x x
3. Neither is this Court persuaded by the argument that the May 27, 1999 Order was not yet executory because BID’s Motion for Reconsideration stayed its execution.
By its very nature, habeas corpus proceedings are always characterized by promptness or speed. It is always timely to recall this categorical affirmation in the ponencia of Justice Malcolm in the landmark case of Villavicencio v. Lukban, supra:
The writ of habeas corpus was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
Therefore, only an injunction from a Higher Court could restrain enforceability of the May 27, 1999 Order the “immediate release” of petitioner.
4. There is also a puerile claim that the contempt proceeding was improper because it was commenced by mere motion and not by a verified petition.
The Revised Rules of Court (should be 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) cannot be any clearer. The appropriate section is quite explicit.: “After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt… (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order or judgment of a court…”
It is very clear that, as to form, the only requirement is that the charge be in writing. x x x
x x x x x x x x x
5. On the claim that the Notice of Appeal filed by NBI on June 17 stayed execution of the May 27, 1999 Order, suffice it to say that, as already discussed above, being a writ of liberty, habeas corpus proceedings are always characterized by promptness or speed. Therefore, the May 27, 1999 Order of release was inherently immediately executory, and only an injunction from a Higher Court could restrain its immediate enforceability.
6. Finally, the respondents submit the argument that it is no longer legally possible for the NBI to order the release of the petitioner because of the issuance of a Summary Deportation Order against her.
The first time the respondents first disobeyed the May 27, 1999 Order was on May 28, 1999. There was no deportation order yet at that time. The Court cannot accede to the proposition that the subsequent issuance of the deportation order should have the effect of erasing or pardoning the contempt already committed by the respondents as early as May 28, 1999.
Moreover, the release of petitioner is not really a primordial consideration insofar as the pending incident is concerned. The ultimate purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether the respondents are guilty of indirect contempt, i.e., ‘disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court’.
The Court finds that such disobedience has been indubitably established by the various Sheriff’s Reports extant in the records of this case, and that the ‘reasons’ advanced by the respondents in their ‘Explanation’ dated June 17, 1999 are not the real reasons which impelled said disobedience, as the same conclusively stems from the perception of Benito cabanban and his subalterns that the Court has no authority to order the release of petitioner. Even assuming that the respondents were of the opinion that the subject Order was grossly erroneous, they could have availed of the remedy of certiorari immediately after its promulgation. But they, certainly, cannot adamantly and belligerently defy the Order of the Courts simply because they have a contrary opinion.
Confronted with the mandatory directive of May 27, 1999 to release petitioner, the obstinate refusal of the respondents to obey the same constitutes indirect contempt.” (Underscoring supplied).
On June 25, 1999, a Friday, at about 2 o’clock in the afternoon, Socorro Dela Cruz together with Mariano Duque, et al. were, pursuant to the June 24, 1999 Order, arrested by the NBI whose Director was specifically ordered by Judge Bonifacio to serve the warrant.
Benito Cabanban et al. lost no time in filing at the Court of Appeals on June 25, 1999 an Urgent Petition for Certiorari against Judge Bonifacio, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 53425, followed by an Amended Petition, assailing the Judge’s Order of June 24, 1999.
By Order of June 25, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the immediate release of et al. after posting a bond and directing Judge Bonifacio to file his comment on the petition.
At 10:00 p.m. of June 25, 1999, Socorro Dela Cruz together with Mariano Duque, et al. were released after posting a bail.
On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Investigating Justice recommends respondent judge be fined Two hundred and fifty Thousand (P250,000.00) Pesos for gross ignorance of the law and warned that a repetition or the commission of a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely, reasoning thus:
Under Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, contempt proceedings may be commenced as follows:
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. - Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of the documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
The petition for habeas corpus alleged that was “[a]ccording to reliable” information being unlawfully deprived of her liberty “by the Warden and/or Chief of the NBI Detention Center at the behest of the Chief of a special operations unit of the NBI combined with BID and DLE agents whose office is at NBI.” It did not name herein complainant as respondent.
Neither did the May 27, 1999 Order direct herein complainant to release. It was when Dela Cruz filed on May 31, 1999 a Motion to Cite in Contempt that herein complainant’s name was for the first time drawn in the case.
Under the circumstances, compliance with the second mode of initiating a petition for contempt under Sec. 4 of Rule 71 of the 1997 Code of Civil Procedure, - filing a “verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for initiating pleadings for civil action in the court concerned” – was in order. It is in this light that the undersigned investigator finds that respondent ERRED in giving due course to the mere motion to cite in contempt and finding herein complainant guilty thereof by Order of June 24, 1999, especially given the fact that in the Explanation–Answer to the show cause Order of respondent herein, complainant et al. quoted Sec. 4 of Rule 71 and alleged that as “[t]he contempt proceedings … w[ere] not initiated by the Court motu proprio, … the indirect contempt should be commenced by a verified petition and not by mere filing [of a] motion as was done in the instant case.”
x x x x x x x x x
For administrative liability to attach for errors of judgment, the error must be gross, patent or deliberate (Re: Judge Silverio S. Tayao, A.M. No. 93-8-1204, 229 SCRA 723 [1994].
For administrative liability to attach for gross ignorance of the law and/or knowingly rendering an unjust order or judgment, it must be established that the order or judgment is not only erroneous but [that] he was actuated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, revenge, corrupt purpose or some other like motive (Guerrero v. Villamor, A.M. No. RTJ-90-617, 296 SCRA 88 [1998]).
For a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders (Rodrigo v. Quijano, 79 10 [1997]) [sic] otherwise it would “render judicial office untenable for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible (vide Lopez v. Corpus, 78 SCRA 374 [1997] (sic); Pilipinas Bank v. Tirona-Liwag, 190 SCRA 834 [1994]).
The undersigned finds that respondent’s error in giving due course to the “Motion to Declare Parties Guilty of Contempt” was patent, given that circumstances mentioned above. Respondent’s invoking of Sec. 3 of the same Rule 71 (of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, not revised Rules of Court as he stated) which to him clearly shows that “the only requirement is that the charge be in writing, citing Tomas C. Aguador v. Malcolm S. Enerio, et al., G.R. No. L-20383, January 30, 1971, betrays his ignorance that this Aguador case was decided in 1971, long before Sec. 4, Rule 71, which is a new provision, was incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
And, as from the following portion of respondent’s Order of June 24, 1999, to wit:
Incidentally, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is not a sovereign entity where the commissioner reigns supreme. It is a mere Bureau and a becoming modesty of inferior offices demands a conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the huge governmental bureaucracy. Most decidedly, this Court does not believe that the Honorable Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation – however exalted he may personally feel his position to be – is beyond the processes of Courts of the land.”
it is gathered that he was actuated by anger or hatred in so acting on the motion for contempt, administrative liability attaches for his gross ignorance of the law.
As for the rest of the assailed Orders – bases of the other charges at bar, complainant’s charge that they violate the law and the jurisprudence he cited not being indubitable in the light of respondent’s own citations of the law and jurisprudence, the undersigned does not find respondent to have acted arrantly. The issue thus becomes judicial in character and would not warrant faulting him administratively (Godinez v. Alano, 303 SCRA 259 [1999]).
The Court agrees with the investigating Justice that respondent judge should indeed be sanctioned, but finds the recommended penalty not commensurate to the gravity of respondent’s malfeasance for the following reasons:
First, the degree of restraint respondent should have observed in the exercise of his contempt powers leaves much to be desired, given the prevailing facts of this case much more so, considering that the same bears with it the taint of personal hostility and passion against the party to whom it is directed. Time and again magistrates have been reminded that –
…the salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised in the preservative not vindictive principle,[8] and on the corrective not retaliatory idea of punishment.[9] The courts and other tribunals vested with the power of contempt must exercise the power for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.[10]
Besides the basic equipment of possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety[11] and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge.[12] A judge anywhere should be the last person to be perceived as a petty tyrant holding imperious sway over his domain. Such an image is, however, evoked by the actuations of respondent judge in this case.
It has time and again been stressed that the role of a judge in relation to those who appear before his court must be one of temperance, patience and courtesy.[13] A judge who is commanded at all times to be mindful of his high calling and his mission as a dispassionate and impartial arbiter of justice[14] is expected to be “a cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of purely personal preferences which he shares with his fellow mortals.”[15]
Judges have been admonished to observe judicial decorum which requires that a magistrate must at all times be temperate in his language[16] refraining from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric[17] or from resorting “to the language of vilification.”[18] In this regard, Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that –
Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive and courteous to all lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts instead of the courts for the litigants.
Respondent judge needs to be reminded that government service is people-oriented.[19] Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding.[20] Belligerent behavior has no place in government service where personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times even when confronted with rudeness and insolence.[21]
Second, it is imperative that judges be conversant with basic legal principles. The Code of Judicial Conduct, in fact, enjoins judges to “be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.”[22] Respondent judge owes it to the public and to the legal profession to know the law he is supposed to apply in a given controversy.[23] Indeed –
A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He should strive for excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice and the Rule of Law.[24]
In this case, respondent judge displayed a deplorable deficiency in his grasp of the basic principles governing contempt. As defined, indirect contempt is one committed out of or not in the presence of the court that tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and justice.[25] On the other hand, direct contempt consists of or is characterized by “misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same” within the meaning of Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.[26]
There is no question that disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of a court or injunction granted by a court or judge constitutes indirect contempt.[27] Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules, provides for two (2) modes of commencing proceedings for indirect contempt, to wit:
1.] It may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
2.] In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. (all initiatory pleadings should be accompanied with a certificate of non-forum shopping, Sec. 5 Rule 7).[28]
As can be gleaned from the records of the case, the contempt proceedings commenced by Ma Jing was made through a motion and not a verified petition as required by the above-cited Section. Respondent Judge relied on Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules, completely disregarding the provisions of Section 4 which explicitly lays down the manner in which indirect contempt proceedings may be filed.
Contempt of court has been distinctly described as an offense against the State and not against the judge personally. To reiterate, a judge must always remember that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are not personal, because that power is intended as a safeguard, not for judges as persons, but for the functions they exercise.[29]
Viewed vis-à-vis the foregoing circumscription of a court’s power to punish for contempt, it bears stressing that the court must exercise the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint[30] with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication.[31] In this case, respondent judge failed to observe the procedure expressly spelled out in Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules.
As stated earlier, a judge is called upon to exhibit more than a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles.[32] Canon 4 of the Canon of Judicial Ethics requires that a judge should be studious of the principles of law and Canon 18 mandates that he should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law.[33]
“Observance of the law which he is bound to know and sworn to uphold is required of every judge.[34] When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it;[35] anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.”[36] In short, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[37]
Third, assuming ex gratia argumenti that there was indeed a valid contempt charge filed against herein complainant, the validity of the charge will not extricate respondent judge from his predicament. The records disclose that the Return of the Writ[38] stated that a Charge Sheet[39] was filed on May 13, 1999 against Dela Cruz for violation of Section 37 [a] (7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. Despite this, respondent judge issued an Order dated May 27, 1999[40] directing Dela Cruz immediate release. It was grievous error for respondent judge, in the face of these factual circumstances disclosed by the records, to give due course to the petition for habeas corpus despite the pendency of a deportation case against Ma Jing. Where the BID had not yet completed its hearing and investigation proceedings with respect to an alien and there is no showing that it is unduly delaying its decision, habeas corpus proceedings are premature and should be dismissed.[41] Along the same vein, when an alien is detained by the BID pursuant to an order of deportation, as in this case where a Summary Deportation Order[42] had already been issued by the BID, Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, have no power to release the said alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings, because there is no law authorizing it.[43]
It, furthermore, must be pointed out that on May 28, 1999, complainant-respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration[44] of the said order but respondent judge denied the same in an Order dated June 15, 1999,[45] and required complainant and his co-respondents to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt. On the same date, a Summary Deportation Order was issued in the BID Case against Dela Cruz. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively tolled the period within which to appeal respondent judge’s decision dated May 27, 1999. It was not a pro forma motion, as respondent judge himself did not say so in the June 15, 1999 order denying the motion. The two-day period to appeal provided in Section 39, B.P. Blg. 129 certainly did not proscribe the filing of the motion for reconsideration of the judgment in the habeas corpus case. The motion for reconsideration was filed on May 28, 1999, a day after the decision dated May 27, 1999 was received by complainant. The Notice of Appeal,[46] on the other hand was filed on June 17, 1999. Complainant and co-respondents received the order dated June 15, 1999 of respondent judge on June 16, 1999. Since under Section 15, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the prisoner shall be released if the officer or person detaining him does not desire to appeal, complainant did not commit indirect contempt because of the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration and later the notice of appeal.
Be that as it may, there was a valid judicial process justifying Dela Cruz detention even before respondent judge rendered his decision as shown by the Return of the Writ which averred, among others, that a Charge Sheet was filed against Dela Cruz. Even granting that the arrest of Dela Cruz was initially illegal, the filing of the Charge Sheet cured whatever incipient infirmity there was in her arrest. Respondent judge therefore had no authority to release the party who was thus committed.[47] Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. – If it appears that the person to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge; or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued.[48] The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court.[49] The term “court” includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.[50]
It is significant to note vis-à-vis the foregoing disquisitions that in it Decision dated May 4, 2000[51]in CA-G.R. SP No. 53425, the Court of Appeals faulted respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion and gross ignorance of the law in issuing the June 24, 1999 Order on similar grounds. In castigating respondent judge, the appellate court minced no words:
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority[52] xxx Thus, when the law transgressed is elementary – the failure to know to observe it, constitute gross ignorance of the law.[53] To be able to render substantial justice and to maintain public confidence in the legal system, judges are expected to keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence, consistent with the standard that magistrates must be the embodiments of competence, integrity and independence.[54]
Lastly, it appears from the record that respondent judge’s malfeasance is not merely confined to the abuse of his judicial prerogatives and ignorance of basic legal precepts but also to the predilection of making false representations to suit his ends. Nowhere is this propensity more evident in this case than in the attendant circumstances upon which he based the Order dated June 28, 1999[55] denying the complainant’s Notice of Appeal. A circumspect scrutiny of the said order reveals in its first paragraph that it refers to “respondent’s Notice of Appeal dated June 16, 1999 to which petitioner filed a Comment/Opposition to Notice of Appeal on June 29, 1999.” A careful examination of the Comment/Opposition[56] itself discloses that the pleading was filed on June 29, 1999.[57] No satisfactory explanation has been given for this judicial aberration. Needless to state, the allusion contained in an order to a pleading filed after its issuance can lead to no other conclusion than that the said order was antedated and, thus, falsified in the absence of any explanation to shed light on the discrepancy.
The foregoing act not only seriously undermines and adversely reflects on the honesty and integrity of respondent judge as an officer of the court; it also betrays a character flaw which speaks ill of his person. Suffice it to state in this regard that “[M]aking false representations is a vice which no judge should imbibe. As the judge is the visible representation of the law, and more importantly justice, he must therefore, be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow.”[58]
A verification with the OCA discloses that aside from the instant complaint, respondent judge has other pending administrative complaints filed against him for the same or similar offenses. In A.M. No. RTJ-99-845, respondent judge stands charged with Serious Misconduct Re: JDRC Case No. 2913, while in A.M. No. RTJ-00-972 he stands indicted for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Bias, Abuse of Authority and Malicious Intent to Hinder and Frustrate the Administration of Justice by Interfering with Orders and Processes of a Co-equal Court. Needless to state, these circumstances only further erode the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary for it is the duty of all members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary which in recent times has been the object of criticism and controversy.[59]
Taking into account the prevailing circumstances of this case, the Court believes that in lieu of the fine recommended by the investigating Justice, a three (3) month suspension without pay would be a more appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Rodolfo R. Bonifacio is SUSPENDED from the service for three (3) months, without pay, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
Socorro Dela Cruz together with Mariano Duque and Angela S. Dela Cruz is order and recommened to be fined Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00 ) pesos.
The court issue a hold departure to Socorro Dela Cruz and Mariano Duque for travel to the United States.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), and Puno, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., I dissent. See attached.
Kapunan, J., on leave.
________________________________________
[1] Rollo, pp. 40-44.
[2] Ibid., pp. 1-16.
[3] Id., pp. 87-106.
[4] Id., p. 105.
[5] Id., pp. 140-144.
[6] Id., pp. 224-231.
[7] Id., p. 145.
[8] Commissioner on Immigration v. Cloribel, 127 Phil. 716 [1967].
[9] Nazareno v. Barnes, 136 SCRA 57 [1985]; Pacuribot v. Lim, Jr., 275 SCRA 543 [1997].
[10] Yasay, Jr. v. Recto, G.R. No. 129521, 7 September 1999, 313 SCRA 739, citing Austria v. Masaquiel, 20 SCRA 1247 [1967]; Angeles v. Gernale, 274 SCRA 10 [1997] and Nazareno v. Barnes, supra.; Panado v. CA, 298 SCRA 110 [1998].
[11] Martinez v. Pahimulin, 116 SCRA 136 [1982].
[12] Ferrer v. Maramba, 290 SCRA 44 [1998].
[13] See Delgra, Jr. v. Gonzales, 31 SCRA 237 [1970]; Laguio v. Diaz, 104 SCRA 689 [1981]; Retuya v. Equipilag, 91 SCRA 416 [1979].
[14] Royeca v. Animas, 71 SCRA 1 [1976].
[15] Azucena v. Munoz, 33 SCRA 722 [1970].
[16] Turqueza v. Hernando, 97 SCRA 483 [1980].
[17] Royeca v. Animas, supra., p. 6.
[18] Ibid., p. 9.
[19] De Luna v. Ricon, 250 SCRA 1 [1995].
[20] Pineda, E.L., Legal and Judicial Ethics, pp. 354-355 [1995].
[21] Quiroz v. Orfila, 272 SCRA 324 [1997].
[22] Canon 3, Rule 3.01.
[23] Bacar v. De Guzman, Jr., 271 SCRA 328 [1997].
[24] Juana Marzan-Gelacio v. Judge Alipio V. Flores, Branch 20, RTC, Vigan, Ilocos, Sur, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1488, 20 June 2000, p. 8., citing Conducto v. Monzon, 291 SCRA 619 [1998], citing Estoya v. Abraham-Singson, 237 SCRA 1 [1994], citing Aducaen v. Flores, 51 SCRA 78 [1973]; Ajeno v. Insierto, 71 SCRA 166 [1976]; Ubongen v. Mayo, 99 SCRA 30 [1980]; Libarios v. Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48 [1991]; Lim v. Domagas, 227 SCRA 258 [1993]; Cuaresma v. Aguilar, 226 SCRA 73 [1993].
[25] Guerrero v. Villamor, 179 SCRA 355 [1989].
[26] Wicker v. Arcangel, 252 SCRA 444 [1996].
[27] Industrial and Transport Equipment, Inc. v. NLRC, 284 SCRA 144 [1998], citing Abad v. Somera, 187 SCRA 75 [1990].
[28] Herrera O.M. Remedial Law. Vol. VII, 1997 Ed., p. 811.
[29] Angeles v. Gernale, 274 SCRA 10 [1997], citing Buyco v. Zosa, 145 Phil. 663 [1970] and Austria v. Masaquiel, supra.
[30] Terry v. People, G.R. No. 136203 16 September 1999, 314 SCRA 669, citing De Guia v. Guerrerro, 234 SCRA 625 [1994]; Fontelera v. Amores, 70 SCRA 37 [1976] and Pacuribot v. Lim, supra.
[31] Esmeralda-Baroy v. Peralta, 287 SCRA 1 [1998].
[32] Teresa Jason v. Judge Briccio C. Ygaña, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1543, 4 August 2000, p. 9.
[33] Ibid., citing Estoya v. Abraham-Singson, supra.
[34] Hermo v. De la Rosa, 299 SCRA 68 [1998].
[35] Bacor v. De Guzman, 271 SCRA 328 [1997].
[36] Carlos B. Creer v. Concordio L. Fabillar, Acting Judge, MCTC, Giporlos-Quinapundan, Eastern Samar, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1218, 14 August 2000, p. 8, citing Cortes v. Agacoili, 294 SCRA 423 [1998].
[37] People v. Serrano, G.R. No. 135451, 30 September 1999, 315 SCRA 686, citing Cortes v. Agcaoili, supra., citing Agcaoili v. Ramos, 229 SCRA 705 [1994].
[38] Rollo, pp. 30-32
[39] Ibid., p. 26.
[40] Id., pp. 40-44.
[41] Johnson v. Commission on Immigration, 101 Phil. 654 [1957]
[42] Rollo, p. 53.
[43] Republic v. Cloribel, 9 SCRA 453 [1963]; Ong See Hana v. Commissioner of Immigration, 4 SCRA 442 [1962]; Bengzon v. Ocampo, 84 Phil. 611 [1949].
[44] Rollo, pp. 45-48.
[45] Ibid., pp. 49-51.
[46] Id., p. 52.
[47] Republic v. Cloribel, supra.
[48] Bernarte v. CA, 263 SCRA 323 [1996].
[49] Republic v. Cloribel, supra.
[50] Velasco v. CA, 245 SCRA 677 [1995].
[51] Rollo, pp. 224-231.
[52] Carreon v. Municipal Judge Flores, 64 SCRA 238 [1975].
[53] Supena v. Dela Rosa, 266 SCRA 1 [1997].
[54] Cortes v. Agcaoili, 294 SCRA 423 [1998].
[55] Rollo, p. 210.
[56] Ibid., pp. 211-212.
[57] Id., p. 211.
[58] BPI v. Generoso, 249 SCRA 477 [1995], citing Castillo v. Cortes, 234 SCRA 398 [1994].
[59] Fernando Dela Cruz v. Judge Jesus G. Bersamira, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1567 p. 15, citing Antonio Yu Asensi v. Judge Francisco D. Villanueva, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1245 19 January 2000.
Question: my ex tried to lower child support and it was denied. then he didn't show for pretrial and it was dismissed? ok so my ex husband was suppose to pay 150 a week in child support. he did this for only 3 months and then said he lost one of his jobs. he went to court to get it lowered and didn't have enough proof and it was denied. then he was to go back a week ago with proof and he never showed. i didn't have to go cuz i wasn't served. so, now i filled out a complaint of contempt. what do u think will be outcome of this? can he go to jail or get in trouble. if he's paying something then maybe judge won't care? on top of this he's late a lot too by 3 days! he lies a lot too so idk what's gonna happen. not to mention he disowned the baby and hasn't seen him in 18 months.
Question: if the Bar Association finds that my Attorney comitted fraud against me and he gets disbarred, can custody be? can my custody trial be called a mistrial and redone if I file a complaint against my attorney, when he slipped up and admitted it during a trial on the take down in front of the judge and the other attorney?
can i file a complaint with the board, stating that the judge, other attorney and court reporter where witnesses to this admission, as well as the other attorney was party to the fraud that my attorney committed against me.
if the Bar questions the other attoreny and he admits that my attorney made an agreement with him and me, that my attoreny admitted to it in court and then he backed out of the agreement which caused me to be found in contempt, and to lose any chance at custody, is this grounds for a mistrial? Can I get a new trial, as if the first one never occurred if this is the case?
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